To better understand how desires to avenge the September 11 th terror attacks affected U.S. public support for the 2003 Iraq War, we integrate data from two uncoordinated surveys-one measuring revenge motivations and the other beliefs about Iraqi complicity-completed by overlapping samples from the same online panel. Citizens who mistakenly blamed Iraq for 9/11 were more likely to say that going to war would satisfy their desires for revenge, which in turn predicted greater war support, controlling for political orientations and the perceived security incentives and costs of war. But a substantial proportion of those who said Iraq was not involved in 9/11 also expected war to satisfy desires for revenge, to an extent that appreciably affected war support. These findings suggest that mistaken revenge and a revenge "spillover" effect both contributed to war support, testify to the importance of emotion and moral motivation in public opinion, and demonstrate the utility of integrating data from online panel surveys.
The surge occurred well before President George W. Bush began sounding alarms about the Iraqi threat, at first in his January 29 th , 2002 "Axis of Evil" speech and then more vigorously that autumn, when the news media finally turned its attention from al-Qaeda, terrorism, and Afghanistan to Iraq (Althaus & Largio 2004; Gershkoff & Kushner 2005; Nacos et al. 2011; Feldman et al. 2015) . 1 For an early discussion of 9/11's effect on U.S. public belligerence, see Foyle (2004) . The case for this "9/11 Effect" is not undermined by two brief spikes in support for "military action" against Iraq, to 74-76%, in 1998 Iraq, to 74-76%, in -1999 . Besides occurring during episodic confrontations with Iraq, these poll questions mentioned neither casualties nor troops, and thus tended to attract greater support than those illustrated in Figure 1 . Many additional items not included in the figure also show a decline in war support over the course of 2002 (Everts & Isernia 2005; Jacobson 2007 ).
One explanation for this heightened public belligerence is that many U.S. citizens mistakenly attributed the attacks to the Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein. Polls fielded right after 9/11 and again over the following years found a majority of Americans agreeing that he was at least "somewhat likely" to have been involved. These responses were inflated by question wording that singled him out for suspicion and by the omission of options describing lesser terrorist dealings (Althaus & Largio 2004) . Still, to the extent that some Americans genuinely blamed Iraq for 9/11, they would have supported war not only to neutralize the Iraqi threat, but also to give Saddam Hussein his "just deserts."
However, desires to avenge 9/11 also could have heightened support for war through a psychological "spillover" effect. Social psychology experiments have found that anger over unpunished crimes heightens aggressiveness towards uninvolved third parties, in interpersonal, intergroup, and criminal punishment contexts (e.g., Bushman et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2006; Tetlock et al. 2007 ). If such spillover effects generalize to political attitudes, pent-up anger and desires for revenge toward al-Qaeda's elusive ringleaders could have led many Americans to support the use of military force against symbolic substitutes like Saddam Hussein.
The distinction between mistaken revenge and revenge spillover is an important one. The former is harder to differentiate from limited-information rationality, because retaliating against a harm-doer often serves deterrence or other security interests, although often the goal is retributive justice as an end-in-itself (Baron & Spranca 1997; Ginges et al. 2007; Carlsmith & Darley 2008) . But indiscriminate retaliation is less likely to serve security goals and violates nearly all accepted standards of justice. Moreover, if popular desires for revenge arouse widespread, indiscriminate support for counter-productive wars, they may open political opportunities for national leaders to wage them.
Past research on public support for the Iraq War has not provided clear tests of the mistaken revenge and revenge spillover explanations. Kull et al. (2003-04) showed that beliefs about Iraqi involvement in 9/11 predicted war support, but did not address whether this was due to revenge, whether mistaken or displaced, or to security or other non-revenge motives.
Correlations observed between Iraq War support and anger at the terrorists and death penalty positions-a proxy for retributiveness-imply some sort of role for revenge (Liberman 2006; Skitka et al. 2006; Huddy et al. 2007) . But these findings also did not address whether angry and vengeful Americans favored war to punish Saddam Hussein for his imagined role in 9/11, or to lash out more indiscriminately. This omission is no doubt due to the apparent absence of any single survey from the period that measured both perceived Iraqi guilt and either anger or revenge directed against the terrorist perpetrators.
We overcome this obstacle by integrating data from surveys that Knowledge Networks, Inc. (KN; since acquired by GfK, Inc.) conducted for different investigators. One survey included a question about Iraq's connection to al-Qaeda and 9/11, and the other asked whether war would satisfy desires for revenge. As an unintentional consequence of the surveys being sampled from the same large online respondent panel, over 350 panelists participated in both, providing critical information on cross-survey associations. Moreover, these associations can be estimated more precisely and with less bias by utilizing the incomplete data collected from those who completed just one of the surveys. Retrospective data integration has not been used previously to analyze online panel survey data, as far as we know, so one of this article's goals is to demonstrate the method's utility for exploiting this increasingly abundant type of opinion data.
Integrating data from the two surveys permits us to isolate mistaken revenge from revenge spillover. Mistaken revenge would be apparent if those who blamed Iraq for 9/11 expected war to satisfy their desires to avenge the terror attacks, whereas revenge spillover would better explain why even citizens who doubted Iraqi involvement might also have expected war to satisfy such desires. Our results provide evidence of both revenge mechanisms, and add to our understanding of the role of revenge in political attitudes. They also suggest that other cases of outrage over other national injuries, particularly when notorious perpetrators elude punishment, might again enable political leaders to mobilize public support for war against uninvolved states.
REVENGE AND AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD IRAQ
The 9/11 terror attacks' lethality, targeting of civilians and national symbols, and unfathomable intent inevitably aroused American desires for revenge. To President Barack Obama, the long hunt for Osama bin Laden "was about a lot more than taking a monstrous leader off the battlefield. It was about so much more than that. It was about righting an unspeakable wrong [and] healing a nearly unbearable wound in America's heart" (Biden 2012 Social psychology research on criminal punishment judgments has found that retributive justice is at least as important as security, and typically matters a lot more. People want to see wrongdoers punished as an intrinsically desirable, moral end-in-itself, rather than as a means to incapacitate threats or to deter future wrongdoing (e.g., Carlsmith & Darley 2008; Nadelhoffer et al. 2013) . These findings resonate with research showing that prudential cost-benefit reasoning is often sidelined when "sacred values" are at stake (e.g., Baron & Spranca 1997; Ginges et al. 2007 ).
The effects of revenge and anger on punitiveness toward uninvolved third parties represent even clearer departures from utilitarian reasoning. Social psychology research has identified three phenomena in which revenge appears to spill over into normatively unrelated judgments and behavior. The best known of these is "displaced aggression," a heightened aggressiveness toward unrelated third parties after having been personally insulted or offended.
The effect is generally greater toward those who have engaged in unwanted behavior ("triggered displaced aggression") or who superficially resemble the original offender (e.g., Marcus-Newhall et al. 2000; Bushman et al. 2005; Pedersen et al. 2008; Sjöström & Gollwitzer 2015) .
Resemblances constituting a common group identity are an important precondition of another revenge-spillover phenomenon, "vicarious retribution." Members of an injured social group tend to attribute collective responsibility to the perpetrator's entire social group, and also tend to support aggressive acts against uninvolved members of that group (e.g., Lickel et al. 2006; Vasquez et al. 2010) . Although this effect has been studied in the contexts of gang violence and other subnational conflict, it could well generalize to identity-based support for interstate war.
Indiscriminate punitiveness also occurs in criminal punishment judgments. Learning about serious, unpunished crimes increases appraisals of uninvolved individuals' misbehavior as more wrongful and deserving of harsh punishment (e.g., Lerner et al. 1998; Rucker et al. 2004; Tetlock et al. 2007) . These "prosecutorial mindsets," moreover, do not appear aimed at restoring deterrence by making an example of an unrelated suspect or offender. They correlate with desires for retributive justice, but not with desires for enhanced deterrence (Rucker et al. 2004; Tetlock et al. 2007 ).
These three revenge-spillover mechanisms suggest that Americans who remained outraged over 9/11 may have supported lashing out at symbolic substitutes for Osama bin Laden and other elusive al-Qaeda ringleaders. Saddam Hussein's ethnic and (superficial) religious similarities to the actual 9/11 perpetrators, and his notoriety as a "rogue state" tyrant, made him a particularly tempting target for Americans who felt an urge to lash out.
Both mistaken revenge and revenge spillover could have shaped citizens' war support long after their initial outrage over 9/11 had subsided. Rumination and reminders about an offense readily revive anger and desires for revenge, along with their effects on judgment (Bushman et al. 2005; Denson 2013 ). On the anniversary of 9/11, for example, two-fifths of Americans said they still thought about the attacks every day. Nearly three-quarters of these ruminators said they still felt "very angry" at the culprits, whereas only about half of those who Despite the plausibility that desires for revenge affected U.S. public support for invading Iraq, these effects remain little understood. However, as we explain in the next section, previously underutilized data can shed new light on the balance between mistaken revenge and revenge spillover, as well as between symbolic and instrumental revenge motives.
DATA INTEGRATION AND ANALYSIS
Although no single survey in the years following 9/11 measured both revenge motives and beliefs about Iraqi complicity, separate surveys tapping each were fielded to a single online panel, resulting in a sizable overlap between the samples. In the following, we first explain our method of integrating the datasets, including our use of multiple imputation to maximize statistical power and minimize selection biases. We then examine whether-consistent with mistaken retribution-blaming Iraq for the attacks predicted feelings that war would satisfy desires for revenge and whether-consistent with revenge spillover-those who thought Iraq was uninvolved also felt that war would satisfy desires for revenge to some degree. Finally, we provide more demanding tests of both the mistaken-revenge and revenge-spillover hypotheses by examining how expected retributive satisfaction related to support for invading Iraq.
Retrospective Integration of Online Panel Survey Data
Online surveys are typically administered to samples drawn from large, stable panels of respondents who complete surveys periodically until retired from the panel (Hays et al. 2015) .
Samples drawn from a single panel, especially within a limited timeframe, often intersect, providing valuable information about cross-survey associations. The size of the overlap, and hence the quality of this information, depends on the sizes of the original samples and of the full panel, the sampling frames used, and intervening panel rotation and dropout.
In preparing to analyze such data, researchers can reduce selection biases and increase statistical power by combining the entire survey datasets and imputing the resultant missing data (Deng et al. 2013) . Online survey firms typically use random or nearly random within-panel sampling frames to solicit panelists to complete surveys, so that being solicited for any two surveys is also essentially random. But individual propensities for panel dropout and survey acquiescence also affect the composition of the intersecting samples, just as in ordinary panel studies (Frankel & Hillygus 2013) . Thus, analysis of just the complete-case intersecting samples results in biased parameter estimates, in addition to neglecting the extensive partial data collected from the panelists who completed only one of the surveys.
Multiple imputation (MI) is a powerful tool for mitigating such attrition biases and for efficiently using the available incomplete data (Rubin 1987; King et al. 2001; Enders 2010; Little & Rubin 2014) . MI involves generating multiple complete datasets, with the imputed values varying across the datasets according to the degree of uncertainty in the imputation model. Using rules developed by Rubin (1987) , these between-imputation variances are then incorporated into the parameters' standard errors when pooling the results of statistical analyses performed separately on each of the completed datasets. By imputing values conditional on all the variables included in the imputation model, MI algorithms correct for biases from attrition (or other causes of missing data) predicted by these variables. Missing data explained by observed variables is referred to as "ignorable missingness," because it can be handled without bias by MI or maximum-likelihood missing data techniques. These techniques do not correct for "nonignorable" missingness caused by non-observed factors, but they yield more efficient and unbiased estimates than complete-case analysis.
Unlike maximum-likelihood missing data methods, MI permits using auxiliary variables (i.e., those not needed for the data analysis) in the imputation model. Profile data, typically collected from online panelists upon recruitment, provide a wealth of complete variables that can be employed for this purpose. Along with having intersecting samples, having common profile data makes it relatively easy and precise to integrate datasets collected from a single online panel, although more sophisticated methods have been developed that also enable the integration of far less congruent datasets (e.g., Carrig et al. 2015) .
In this article we integrate two probability surveys that KN administered to adult samples of its U.S. online panel, which at the time numbered 34,748. Kull et al. 2003-04) .
The other survey, which included questions on revenge, was fielded March 13-April 9, 2003 for the second author (N=3,534; with 81% completed prior to the outbreak of war on March 20 th , we refer to this as the "March" survey).
2 Merging these datasets resulted in a combined dataset of 6334 unique panelists, with 6% having participated in both surveys (N=363), 44% only in the February survey, and 50% only in the March survey.
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We multiply imputed the unit-and item-nonresponses together for the combined dataset, using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to generate 100 complete datasets. 4 A large number of MI datasets is recommended to maintain statistical power in cases with extensive missing data (Graham et al. 2007 ). The imputation model included all the analysis variables plus additional auxiliary variables, including demographics collected from all respondents upon recruitment into the panel, March items on war support, and items on war support and the Iraq-al-Qaeda connection measured in three other PIPA surveys. 5 Although the intersection was less educated and older than the original samples, if no different in political interest and awareness, MI adjusts for these idiosyncrasies. 6 Unmeasured sources of attrition might still bias our results, but it is unclear that they would do so in a direction systematically favorable to our main hypotheses. Moreover, we adjust for differences between the original survey samples and the U.S. population by controlling for these attributes in our regression analyses.
Explaining Expected Retributive Satisfaction from War
We measure revenge motives by assessing people's expectations that punishing an offense will resolve or satisfy their desires for revenge. The March survey measured such retributive satisfaction by asking how much going to war would "satisfy or resolve each of the following for you: A sense of moral outrage about the 9/11 terrorist attacks; A need to prove that the U.S. can't be pushed around; A desire to hurt those responsible for the 9/11 attacks; [and] A compelling need for vengeance for the 9/11 terrorist attacks." Although pluralities said "not at all," most citizens said that war would satisfy desires for revenge to some degree (see Figure 2 ).
We combined the highly inter-correlated responses to these items into an additive scale of Avenges. People might not be fully aware of the reasons for their attitudes, and tend to agree post hoc with reasonable-sounding justifications regardless of their actual motivating role (Lodge & Taber 2013) . But widespread norms against retribution-especially when described as "vengeance" and even more so when inflicted on innocents-makes it unlikely that war advocates, especially those who doubted Iraqi complicity, exaggerated the retributive satisfaction they expected from invading Iraq. People generally exaggerate their instrumental reasons for punishment, and downplay their retributive ones (Ellsworth & Gross 1994; Carlsmith 2008 ).
PIPA's February 2003 question about Iraq's involvement with al-Qaeda and 9/11, and public responses, are shown in Table 1 . Those who said Iraq was "directly involved" in 9/11 most clearly blamed Iraq for the attacks, whereas those who selected "no connection" or just "contact" between Iraq and al-Qaeda must have doubted Iraqi involvement. Although the "substantial support to al-Qaeda" option explicitly rules out Iraqi involvement in the attacks, those who selected this option may have felt that reckless aid to the actual perpetrators justified retributive-justice as well as security reasons for destroying the Iraqi regime. In theory, political partisanship and cue taking from elite discourse also might have generated spurious associations between Avenges and Iraq War. Although hardly any U.S.
political leaders publicly justified invading Iraq as retribution for 9/11, President Bush claimed that Iraq and al-Qaeda belonged to an "Axis of Evil" and he persistently conflated Iraq and terrorism (Althaus & Largio 2004; Gershkoff & Kushner 2005; Nacos et al. 2011; Feldman et al. 2015) . Partisans differed over both going to war and Iraqi involvement in 9/11 (Jacobson 2007; Berinsky 2009; Prasad et al. 2009; Jacobson 2010; Feldman et al. 2015) . Thus partisanship or motivated reasoning could have generated correlations between a variety of stated beliefs, attitudes, and feelings about Iraq. To control for such effects, we use standard measures of partisanship, ideology, and political awareness, plus a scale of general approval of U.S. foreign policies.
Figure 3 plots the coefficients from a regression of Avenges on the Iraq-al-Qaeda connection options and the control variables, using the MI combined datasets, with all variables scaled 0-1. 10 The Contact, Support, and Involved coefficients indicate the estimated effect of each view on Avenges, relative to those who said "no connection." Consistent with the mistaken revenge hypothesis, citizens saying that Iraq was "directly involved" expressed significantly higher retributive satisfaction than did those who said "no connection." Involved's differences with Contact and Support were also statistically significant (all at p<.001). Predicted means and 95% confidence intervals, based on Models 1-3 in Appendix §5. The adjusted estimates are for those who said that war would neither hurt nor help the war on terrorism, said that they opposed war with North Korea, said that the United States could not defeat North Korea and Iraq simultaneously, and who were otherwise average (using U.S. census data for age and education, to correct for these unrepresentative attributes of the KN samples).
The adjusted MI estimates are of particular interest, because they correct attrition biases, are more precise than the intersection-only estimates, and remove the influence of potential confounders. They also narrow the difference in Avenges between those who blamed Iraq and those who did not,,revealing revenge spillover to be more prevalent, and mistaken revenge less prevalent, than indicated by the bivariate and intersection-only estimates. However, the broadly similar findings in all three sets of estimates show that they are robust to our modeling assumptions and missing data procedures.
Mistaken revenge cannot explain why anyone who did not blame Iraq for 9/11 would have said they anticipated war to satisfy desires for revenge. The citizens who said Iraq had no more than "contact" with al-Qaeda, and who expected at least some retributive satisfaction from war, thus represent the clearest evidence for revenge spillover. But many of those who said Iraq gave "substantial support…but was not involved" also might not have blamed Iraq for the attacks. Indeed, even some "directly involved" responses may have stemmed from prosecutorial mindsets aroused by anger over 9/11, motivated reasoning, post-decisional justification, or having been asked specifically about Iraqi involvement, rather than from prior beliefs or misinformation about Iraq. If so, these processes, rather than mistaken revenge, would have been the source of the resultant retributive satisfaction.
Beliefs that war would bolster security at low cost do not appear to have strongly shaped retributive satisfaction from war. Most of the control variables tapping perceived security threats and war risks-including Blowback, US Prowess, Casualties, WMD, and the North Korea preventive war variables-are insignificant predictors of Avenges, as shown in Figure 3 .
Elevated levels of Avenges among those who said that Iraq had given "substantial support" to alQaeda, and who said that invading Iraq would "help" on the "war on terrorism," might reflect security concerns. However, to the extent that people blamed Iraq morally for having aided alQaeda and felt that the "war on terrorism" aimed at justice rather than security, these results instead could reflect retributive motives.
Approval of the Bush administration or its foreign policies offer a more plausible nonrevenge source of people saying they felt war would satisfy desires to avenge 9/11. Although neither partisanship nor ideology predicts Avenges in Figure 3 , Approve FP is a strong predictor (and its presence masks the variation explained by political orientation This result is consistent with a small mistaken revenge effect, although-as with all mediation tests-it might be biased by unobserved covariates and it assumes rather than tests the causal direction among these three variables (Green et al. 2010) . . In addition, though somewhat attenuated, Avenges remains substantively and statistically significant when dropping the cases with the most missing data (see SI §4, Models 5-6). 15 Full results provided in SI §5. 16 The direct effect of Involved remains substantial, perhaps reflecting security motives to neutralize an Iraqi threat, retributive motivation not captured by Avenges (due to selfpresentation bias or lack of self-awareness), or post-decisional rationalization in claims about Iraqi wrongdoing (Prasad et al. 2009 ). These alternatives cannot be adjudicated with the present data. The desires for revenge among many who did not blame Iraq for 9/11 were also strong enough to have meaningfully affected war support. The means of Avenges for those who said "no connection" and just "contact" are associated with increases in war support of .08-.09 on a 0-1 scale (both differences significant at p<.001) over that expressed by citizens who expressed no retributive satisfaction at all, holding the demographic, political, and security controls constant.
These results cannot be explained by security motivations, risk appraisals, or cue taking from elite discourse. The estimated effect of Avenges on war support in Figure 5 controls for all the potential confounders mentioned earlier, including perceptions of Iraqi WMDs, the invasion's impact on the "war on terrorism," U.S. strength, other costs and risks of war, partisanship, ideology, approval of US foreign policy, and political awareness. Moreover, controlling for awareness interactions with partisanship, ideology, and approval of US foreign policy does not alter our main findings.
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DISCUSSION
Retrospectively integrating data from uncoordinated online panel surveys indicates that both mistaken revenge and revenge spillover contributed to U.S. public belligerence toward Iraq.
These findings are consistent with, but go beyond, previous studies suggesting that revenge played some sort of role in U.S. public support for the 2003 Iraq War (Liberman 2006; Skitka et al. 2006; Huddy et al. 2007 ). They also speak to broader theoretical debates about moral motivations for and against violence (e.g., Cushman et al. 2012; Fiske & Rai 2014) , the revenge motive for war support (Liberman 2006 (Liberman , 2007 (Liberman , 2013 (Liberman , 2014 , and its relation to models of instrumental, cost-benefit reasoning about the use of force (e.g., Jentleson & Britton 1998; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi et al. 2009 ).
Our analyses control for the Bush Administration's most-touted security goalsneutralizing Iraq's WMD and advancing the "war on terrorism." Public desires for revenge might have reflected, in part, an intuitive wish to bolster deterrence by showing that the United States "can't be pushed around," even if the administration did not openly articulate this justification for war. But controlling for the belief that invading Iraq would help the "war on terrorism" ought to have attenuated this motive's impact on our results. Moreover, people generally desire message-sending punishments to restore self-esteem and status as much as to deter future offenses (Shnabel & Nadler 2008; Gollwitzer & Denzler 2009; Gollwitzer et al. 2011; Funk et al. 2014 ). Thus, our findings imply that non-instrumental revenge motives contributed to public support for going to war against Iraq.
This, in turn, suggests a novel explanation for the post-9/11 rise and decline of public belligerence toward Iraq, illustrated above in Figure 1 . . In turn, this suggests that other mass-casualty attacks on a powerful nation might again enable its government to attack an uninvolved state.
Our analysis was made possible by the original online surveys having been fielded by a single firm. With an ever-growing mountain of data left behind by the boom in online survey research over the past fifteen years, integrating data from uncoordinated online surveys might well enable or facilitate research on a wide range of other public opinion questions (Hays et al. 2015) . Although particularly valuable for projects, like ours, dependent on a unique historical context. retrospective integration also might be useful simply as a more economical way to acquire a particular combination of variables than commissioning an original probability survey.
Not all projects will be as amenable to this approach as the one reported here. The precision of our cross-survey estimates benefited from the relatively large intersection between surveys, which was due in turn to relatively large original sample sizes, surveys being fielded within a short span of time, and a stable respondent panel of tractable size. Since 2003, the KNGfK panel has grown from 35,000 to 55,000 members, and some online panels (such as YouGov-Polimetrix's) are so enormous that random samples will yield infinitesimal intersections. However, one might still find ample intersections between surveys that jointly target specialized panel subpopulations, such those with political profile data, and such datasets will also possess complete profile variables likely to be useful for both imputation and analysis.
18 Another factor may have been growing skepticism about Bush's policies among politically aware Democrats (Kam & Ramos 2008; Berinsky 2009; Feldman et al. 2015) . 19 The percentage of citizens who said that Iraqi involvement in the attacks was at least "somewhat likely" declined by 7% over the year following the attacks (Althaus & Largio 2004 ).
More frequent depositing of datasets in open-access archives, especially if unique panelist serial numbers were included, would greatly facilitate such research in the future. Also helpful would be the further development of statistical techniques and software routines tailored for the analysis of intersecting survey samples, such as methods for integrating three datasets and algorithms to re-weight combined datasets. New tools for correcting non-ignorable attrition biases in panel studies with refreshment samples would also be useful for analyzing intersecting surveys, which have similar-though more extreme-selection and missing data issues (Si et al. 2015) . • There has been some discussion about whether the US should use its troops to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. Which of the following positions is closest to yours…The US should not invade, the US should only invade Iraq with UN approval and the support of its allies, [or] The US should invade Iraq even if we have to go it alone.
APPENDIX §1. MEASURES AND QUESTION WORDING
• Which of the following positions is closer to yours… Even if the UN showed too little resolve in dealing with Iraq the past, we can and should insist that it do a better job this time. War should only be used as a last resort after having tried in every way to make the inspection process work, [or] Past experience has shown that with time the UN will lose its resolve in the inspection process, and Iraq will become increasingly uncooperative. Therefore it is necessary to invade Iraq and remove the Iraqi government. , what do you think are the chances that there will be a major terrorist attack against the US as a form of revenge? Please answer on a scale of one to one hundred, with 0 meaning no likelihood, 100 meaning that such an attack is certain, and 50 meaning that there is a 50 percent chance of this happening." Recoded into deciles and rescaled 0-1.
Casualties. "About how many American soldiers do you imagine would die in a war with Iraq?"
The highly skewed open-ended responses were recoded into deciles before being scaled 0-1; logging the raw data yielded very similar results.
WMD. Pooled responses to identical PIPA June and July questions asking: "Please indicate your position on the question of whether, just before the war, Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 meaning you are completely certain that Iraq did NOT have weapons of mass destruction, 10 meaning that you are completely certain that Iraq DID have weapons of mass destruction, 5 meaning you are unsure."
Approve FP. An additive scale of six equally weighted 10-level items (complete-case Cronbach's α=.92; combined prior to imputation):
• Overall, how well do you think the US government is managing its foreign policy--that is, dealing with international problems and handling relations with other countries around the world? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being very poorly and 10 being very well.
• How well do you think the US government is dealing with the following international problems and issues? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being very poorly and 10 being very well…. The situation with North Korea? The spread of nuclear weapons? • How well do you think the US government is handling relations with the following countries? Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being very poorly and 10 being very well…Russia? China? Our European allies?
Awareness. An additive scale of equally weighted items; the first six are from the February survey, the remainder from political affairs profile data pre-collected for 2/3 of the March sample (complete-case Cronbach's α=.59; combined post-imputation).
• Republican. Constructed from items in the KN political profile data included in the March 2003 dataset and PIPA partisanship items. In the KN political profile data, "not strong" Democrat and Republican options are combined into the "strong" partisan categories to provide a five-level item comparable to the PIPA item, which asked "In politics today, do you think of yourself as strong Democrat, leaning toward Democrat, leaning toward Republican, strong Republican, independent, or other." For both measures, independents and "other" are coded as a middle category. The responses were then pooled across surveys, using the profile data when available and otherwise the earliest available PIPA measure. 
